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COMMUNICATION ARTICLE 
 
REMAKING BANDUNG SIXTY YEARS ON 
 
Bill Durodié 
 
Department of Politics, Languages and International Studies, The University of Bath, Bath, UK 
 
 
This Communication Article proposes that if the Bandung Spirit is to be revived in the twenty-first 
century, then this will necessitate an appreciation in the first instance of how different the world is 
today from conditions 60 years ago – both across the Global South but also, more particularly, in the 
West. The key shift may have been one from an assertive imposition of rule based on a clarity of vision 
and purpose, to a more insecure and reactive form of engagement that lacks direction. This latter 
seeks to compensate for an absence of meaning behind forms of procedural risk management. It will 
be the ability of the former colonies to put forward a direction that captivates all, based on 
transcending the past and presenting coherent human values rather than mere economic might that 
will determine the future. 
 
The Cold War context 
 
The Bandung Conference 60 years ago was the first significant gathering of leaders of Asian and African 
states. They met with a view to formulating an agenda for the world to meet their own needs, as 
opposed to those of their former colonial masters. On the occasion of this anniversary others – no 
doubt – will reflect upon their consequent declaration, actions and legacy. My purpose here is 
somewhat different – it is to highlight the extent to which the context for any renewed solidarities has 
altered – as to only understand those nations directly concerned is to appreciate little of the broader 
circumstances and potential for change today. 
 
Sixty years is on a par with a human life – it appears eminently comprehensible. But, as the novelist 
L.P. Hartley wrote in the opening line to his novel ‘The Go-Between’ – a work published just two years 
prior to the Bandung Conference – which also reminisces about mediating the relations of others over 
a similar period: ‘The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there’.1 It is maybe this that 
we should note the most as we examine the opportunities to strengthen cooperation and reshape 
destinies for the Global South. 
 
In 1955, many of the senior statesmen who attended the Bandung Conference represented newly 
independent and, accordingly, optimistic and confident nations. These were great leaders – 
irrespective of their outlooks and impacts – simply through their having been forged by the process of 
the struggle for independence. The list of those in attendance included Sukarno, Nehru, Nasser and 
Zhou Enlai. Other influential figures, such as Nkrumah and Ho Chi Minh, kept abreast of developments 
and were to be central to the nascent Non-Aligned Movement. They were remarkable leaders whose 
names command a modicum of respect to this day. 
 
But these aspirational and inspirational figures also faced an assertive and confident West that was 
waging a global war against communism, even if many of those it tarred with the label were nothing 
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of the sort. The United States in particular had been propelled to the position of world hegemon as 
the old European powers had effectively destroyed each other through the Second World War.2 Its 
authority on the world stage went from being incidental to instrumental, but it was also increasingly 
shaped through Cold War paranoia. 
 
There is an old African proverb which proposes that: ‘When two elephants fight it is the grass that 
suffers’3 – and the young, hopeful grass of the Global South certainly did suffer as a consequence of 
the circumstances. Leaders across the world were co-opted by the West to fight the Cold War on its 
behalf or they were brutally rejected and opposed. Some sought to insulate themselves from the 
destabilizing effects of such external political pressures by aligning themselves accordingly to anti-
communism.4 
 
So, despite the fine words expressed at that original Bandung Conference, many nations soon found 
themselves on a long and bloody detour that some of their leaders today might prefer to forget. That 
is why we continue to refer above all to the ‘Bandung Spirit’ rather than to the specificities of the 
associated declaration and its impact. It is an implicit recognition that this moment represented an 
unmet set of ambitions. Youthful optimism had failed to make its mark, and there may accordingly be 
some unfinished business to revisit. 
 
But ‘the past is another country’, and we must start by recognizing how different the situation is in the 
world today. The Cold War ended in the period between 1989 and 1991 – from the dismantling of the 
Berlin Wall to the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union. It is the impact and legacy of this that we 
need to understand – and particularly its effects upon the Western imagination – if we are truly to 
appreciate the potential opportunities and challenges presenting themselves today to any who might 
hope to create a coherent and united alternative. 
 
A confused West 
 
The Cold War provided a degree of moral purpose and direction to the West. Among many other 
elements, this period witnessed relatively large sums of capital being directed to and invested in the 
Global South as part of a concerted propaganda campaign designed to show that the market system 
worked. Some of this coincided with the West’s own optimism in this period – such as efforts in 
development and healthcare to build infrastructure and fight disease.5 
 
Hospitals were built and some scourges – like smallpox and polio – were eradicated, although the 
failure to wipe-out malaria, coinciding with an economic slow-down in the West and a concomitantly 
more pessimistic period, also led to suggestions that problems would not be solved simply by throwing 
money at them. Accordingly, the 1980s emerged as a ‘lost decade’ for old-style development and this 
evolved into the supposedly ‘sustainable’ focus of the 1990s that also witnessed the rise of less 
tangible (and fungible) indicators, such as ‘well-being’.6 
 
Once the Cold War ended, interest in the development of the Global South appeared to stop suddenly. 
In many ways, this was just as disruptive as the earlier period of intervention. Most extant leaders lost 
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their authority as relations of patronage came to an end. Many had effectively been compromised by 
these. But a new – domestic – form of dependency now emerged. One that was beholden to the needs 
of capital, rather than anti-communism.7 As the focus shifted from politics to business, so the potential 
for corruption increased through the pursuit of government largesse in the form of contracts, permits 
and licences. 
 
Interest in these regions from the West only began to be renewed subsequent to the events of 9/11 
and then largely on a piecemeal basis, lacking strategic direction and coordination.8 And, as some 
commentators have noted, aside from being highly reactive, much of this could be argued to be more 
about allowing Westerners to feel good about themselves than about resolving any actual problems 
elsewhere.9 
 
It is a moot point to ask whether the Global South was better served by overly confident and assertive 
powers, such as the United States, which tried to shape the world in their own image or, as is the case 
now, by confused and uncertain actors that react nervously to world events, without having a clear 
sense of purpose or direction. Either way, one might presume, the ‘grass’ of the Global South might 
continue to suffer. 
 
The end of the Cold War was portrayed as a period of opportunity for the West.10 However, it was also 
to generate new problems as the then British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, understood full well 
when she briefed President Gorbachev in private meetings that the lifting of the Iron Curtain and 
German reunification would; ‘undermine the stability of the whole international situation and could 
endanger our security’.11 
 
For over 40 years the world had largely been divided between two competing ideologies – a socialist 
East and a free-market West. The division extended beyond the protagonists themselves to include 
their satellite states and supporters in Eastern Europe and across the rest of the globe. It was also 
reflected internally in a split between broadly left-leaning parties and a more centrist or conservative 
right. Accordingly, it was a division that also shaped and defined identities and culture.12 
 
Those who disputed the state of affairs in the West were often advised to go and live in Moscow. 
Elsewhere, as in the Global South, they might be met with a more violent riposte. But what impact 
would it have on the protagonists once Moscow also became part of the capitalist system? Fukuyama’s 
‘end of history’ thesis,13 and Thatcher’s dictum that ‘there is no alternative’,14 were hardly uplifting or 
inspiring. Where were those who still believed in progress to go? 
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The market might add value. But it has little to say about values – in the moral sense. It is this more 
human dimension that appears to have been by-passed or elided in recent times. And yet it is precisely 
the pursuit of what it is that provides our lives with meaning that remains at issue. The old right may 
seem to have won the economic wars, but the old left would continue to wage the culture wars in 
pursuit of something more to life than mere existence. 
 
At the same time there was a need, most acutely felt by the elites, to establish a new basis for authority 
in the period ahead.15 In many instances, this took the form of identifying new enemies to replace the 
gap left by the former Soviet Union. These have included, the escalation of the War on Drugs in Central 
America, Saddam Hussein in Iraq (twice), General Aidid in Somalia, Slobodan Milosevic in the former 
Yugoslavia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as Al-Qaeda, both there and in Iraq, together with the 
so-called Islamic State group,16 to name just a few. 
 
We should recognize that this process is primarily an unconscious one. Few officials or politicians wake 
up each day to reflect upon what new enemies they might find to assist them in galvanizing their 
populations around a shared project. Rather, it is simply something that emerges because it appears 
to work in a period lacking more principled political discourse and debate. Even Bill Clinton – famously 
elected with his domestically focused mnemonic ‘It’s the economy, stupid’17 – was, in his turn, rapidly 
side-tracked into a futile conflict in Somalia. 
 
It may indeed appear easier to leaders, who need to maintain their domestic legitimacy, to jet around 
the world stage purporting to solve problems there in the full glare of the world’s media, than it is for 
them to address more material issues pertaining to industrial and moral decline at home. It is also the 
case that the media focus on their foreign interventions soon dies down and few are ever held 
accountable for conditions there after they have moved on – unlike at home, where any claims to 
efficacy would be scrutinized more closely and on a more protracted basis. 
 
Lessons for the South? 
 
The loss of ideology heralded by the end of the Cold War has led to a search for meaning amongst the 
general population and the identification of new threats by the elites.18 The latter need not always be 
external. The war on drugs also takes on an internal dimension and there are an increasing number of 
problems identified that are primarily domestic – such as the so-called war on obesity, as well as 
attempts to challenge anti-social behaviour.19 
 
These latter rely on assuming and projecting a population of vulnerable individuals needing advice or 
protection from a benign and enlightened state. But, in that regard, this shift from focusing on security 
towards insecurity, or to managing behaviour may be self-defeating in the long run as the state itself 
is a product of assuming people to be rational agents, not imminent victims.20 The search for new 
forms of affiliation has also enhanced the scope of identity politics which – in its turn – could also 
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become a race to the bottom as groups and individuals compete to identify themselves as the most 
victimized.21 
 
Nationalism – itself a defensive posture in its historical genesis – also stands widely discredited, 
particularly in the West, through its association with racism and the causes of the Second World War.22 
Accordingly, many have looked either to supra-national bodies – such as the UN, EU (or ASEAN and 
the AU in the Southeast Asian and African contexts) – or sub-national entities – like non-governmental 
organizations or civil society groups – as new sources of authority in the contemporary context. 
 
The problem with these is that they readily become remote and unaccountable to ordinary people. As 
one Cambridge-based academic has noted, the European Union for example, reflects a shift away from 
the nation state that emerged as representative of and accountable to the people, to member states 
that pursue moral agendas determined elsewhere and who now view their domestic populations as 
potential problems needing to be controlled.23 
 
Likewise, Furedi has noted how consumer activism, despite its radical appeal, is linked to a decline in 
electoral engagement.24 Civil society groups are readily co-opted to government agendas, often being 
dependent on these for their financial survival or looking to them to implement change. They are 
indulged by those who wish to appear radical, as well as a media that relies on presenting a supposed 
counter to dominant narratives. But the realities of power often force campaigners to compromise 
their views and adopt the agendas of others.25 
 
Some in the Global South have noted the interventionist tendencies unleashed by these elements, 
associated with a supposedly liberal internationalist outlook. But it would be wrong for them to 
presume the counter to this to be a renewed nationalism of their own that, in its turn, would serve to 
encourage and foment a divisive form of identity politics. The South will certainly need to look to itself 
to solve its own problems. But we should not confuse autonomy and agency with difference and 
separation. Rather, there may be a need to be both rooted and to promote a more human-oriented 
outlook – one that the West abandoned by its failure to see through the logic of the Enlightenment 
project. 
 
Of course, throughout the post-war period many nations in the Global South emerged economically 
through their own efforts too – even if the ‘swamps to skyscrapers’ narrative of some can be shown 
to have been a bit of a myth.26 We should not be downbeat about the past, but nor should we seek to 
rewrite its history. It is simply untrue that the British, French, Dutch, Portuguese, Spanish, Germans 
and Italians left nothing in their wake. They left systems of law and democracy, as well as considerable 
infrastructures that were adopted and adapted to meet local needs. The spirit of freedom is innate to 
all human beings even if, through historical accident, many social, scientific and political 
transformations emerged from the West. 
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25 James Heartfield, ‘Capitalism and Anti-Capitalism’, Interventions 5, no.2 (2003): 271–89. 
26 See, for instance, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-31626174 (accessed May 17, 2016) and responses 
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It would also be a mistake to confuse the Global South taking-off with any imminent desire or potential 
by the various parties concerned to be more assertive. It is easier to make significant advances once 
others have opened up the way. GDP growth rates reflect this. Putting flushing toilets into every home 
and even building high-speed rail lines is relatively straightforward. These also improve the quality of 
life. But the question remains whether the nations that benefit will be able to move beyond past 
achievements to a situation where they can provide greater leadership, both technical and political. 
That may require something else. 
 
In his case for The New Asian Hemisphere, the former Permanent Secretary and Ambassador to the 
UN turned Dean of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, 
Kishore Mahbubani, points to Asia already having the biggest and most of everything – the fastest 
growth rates, the largest exporters, the most foreign exchange reserves, the biggest cities, the tallest 
buildings, the largest infrastructure projects, the most PhDs in science and engineering and, of course, 
the most people.27 
 
But size – as Singapore more than most states knows – is not everything. Solving problems by 
maintaining an undeveloped reserve army of labour can hold a country back. It is not the same as 
moving forward through the advance of innovative solutions. The most remarkable aspect of Britain 
and America’s domination of the world in each of the preceding centuries was that this was achieved 
with remarkably small populations – the US having fewer than 80 million people at the turn of the 
twentieth century, by which time it had already assumed the lead in the production of many 
commodities.28 
 
What the US had – and what the Global South most needs to achieve – is a coherent vision or set of 
values applied to diverse circumstances. America, as famously immortalized by the poet Francis Scott 
Key in 1814 and subsequently embedded into its national anthem, was the ‘land of the free’.29 It was 
not the land of the safe or secure as some would appear to prioritize today. These latter were 
understood to emerge from being free first – free to pursue one’s own project in a free market, free 
to believe in and worship whomever one liked and free to speak about anything. It was an inspirational 
value that drove it forward and that others bought into too. 
 
It was not without reason that the Bandung Conference was held in Gedung Merdeka.30 And even 
after the Second World War it had been the assumed neutrality of the US and its offer of liberation to 
the colonies that had bought it considerable good will and time there.  
 
Sadly, it is its own confusion over the significance of its founding values that most holds the US back 
today.31 But that is a challenge that can only be addressed and resolved there. For the Global South it 
behoves it to pick up the baton dropped by the West – to pursue the human-centred project of 
freedom and development for all that was either abandoned or is now merely spoken of rhetorically 
by those who once advocated for and projected it.32 
 
                                                          
27 Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2008). 
28 Kemp, The Climax of Capitalism. 
29 Francis Scott Key, The Star-Spangled Banner (1814), http://amhistory.si.edu/starspangledbanner/the-
lyrics.aspx (accessed May 17, 2016). 
30 Literally ‘Freedom Building’ in Bahasa. 
31 Bill Durodié, ‘War on Terror or a Search for Meaning?’, in Looking Back, Looking Forward: Perspectives on 
Terrorism and Responses to it, US Joint Chiefs of Staff/Department of Defense Strategic Multi-Layer Assessment 
White Paper (Arlington, VA, 2013), 21–30. 
32 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (London: Penguin, 1961). 
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Whither Bandung? 
 
To pursue projects that promote humanity rather than national identity is the gap that needs to be 
filled today by any purporting to recreate a Bandung Spirit. The pride of the Chinese people (and many 
others besides) at the opening of the Beijing Olympics in 2008 was based as much on the universal 
appeal of sporting excellence as on any supposed nationalism. In a similar way, whilst India continues 
to face profound social and economic problems today, every village schoolchild knows that it has its 
own space programme – unlike Britain. Indeed, far from being a diversion of resources, such ambitions 
– 40 years since the Americans last left the moon – both exemplify the spirit of humanity and can 
galvanize people into action. 
 
The West’s problems in this regard are profound. It suffers not so much from a decline as from a sense 
of insecurity, which it projects onto its own populations and others. It would be wrong therefore to 
read its actions in many instances as being narrowly cynical or hypocritical. That would be to impute 
too much. Rather, it is better to understand the West as being confused as to its own trajectory, history 
and legacy. Its own fears of freedom and progress are then attributed to external causes. 
 
So China becomes a problem for the West, not because of China per se or old-fashioned racial ideology 
as would have been the case in the past, but because development and even people are problematized 
in general. When there are problems in China – such as a high-speed rail crash – Western 
commentators are quick to question the wisdom of advancing technology there. China, we are told, is 
doing too much, too quickly, without the necessary checks. 
 
It would be better for China not to react in a hostile or even insecure way to such accusations. Rather, 
it might benefit it considerably more to be circumspect in its response – to thank Westerners for their 
interest and to advise them that, when they finally get around to developing and building such systems 
of their own, then China will always be there to offer advice when they encounter problems. 
 
The challenge today is that – having colonized much of the Global South 150 years ago – the West 
would now like to recolonize its mind with presumed and projected fears about growth, the 
environment, lack of natural resources, and there being too many people. Notably, in this view, people 
are presented as problems rather than as problem-solvers. Everything is presented as a risk. And the 
West needs others to buy-into this agenda too – if only to hold them back and reduce whatever threat 
they might pose in the future. 
 
The task for a new Bandung Spirit is not to fall for this agenda. It is to develop and promote its own 
narrative, based on its own needs and ambitions. To argue not about what it fears or what it is against, 
but for what it seeks to achieve and what it is for. This is a story that ought to be for, and appeal to, 
the whole of humanity – and not be exclusive to particular nations or the Global South. The trick will 
be to build on and transcend the limitations of the past – both technical and social. 
 
One character who would have made a welcome addition to the original Bandung Conference but was 
not there was the great Caribbean writer C.L.R. James. He may be best known for his writings on 
cricket,33 and that other – forgotten – revolution of the eighteenth century – the Haitian Revolution, 
the only successful slave uprising in history that went on to keep the colonial powers at bay.34 But he 
was also a friend and biographer of Nkrumah,35 who had been kept away from Bandung by the British 
but who did so much to drive the ‘Bandung Spirit’ on. 
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James was well aware of the problems and limitations of Empire but he was also reluctant to throw 
out the baby with the bath water. ‘I denounce European colonialism’ he wrote, ‘but I respect the 
learning and profound discoveries of Western civilisation’, adding, ‘I, a man of the Caribbean, have 
found that it is in the study of Western literature, Western philosophy and Western history that I have 
found out the things that I have found out, even about the underdeveloped countries’.36 
 
A true Bandung Spirit for the twenty-first century would pick up the pieces nervously dropped by those 
who now fear change in the West and become a new beacon for all of humanity to follow. It is human 
civilization, human literature, human philosophy and human history that really matter. And, in that 
regard, our focus ought not to be whether we are for the West or the South – but simply to know what 
it is we are for – to establish a new humanism through Merdeka. 
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